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WHY THE BLIGHT DISTINCTION IN POST-KELO 
REFORM DOES MATTER 
David A. Dana 
Professor Somin’s response1 to my article on post-Kelo2 reform, The 
Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo,3 makes 
several intriguing points.  And it provides a more current take on takings re-
forms in the states, which are certainly still in flux. 
Professor Somin, however, overstates the number of states that have 
flatly banned blight and economic development condemnations, and hence 
underplays the central importance of the distinction between “blighted” and 
non-blighted property in the post-Kelo reform legislation, initiatives and 
court cases.  The Nevada initiative is not yet part of the Nevada Constitu-
tion;4 a second round of voting will be required before it is ratified5 (al-
though perhaps the easy passage in the first round of voting suggests it will 
pass again).  The Kansas statute still allows blight condemnations for seri-
ous housing code violations, which may not be that hard to find in the stock 
of urban rental housing in poor neighborhoods.6  The statute, in practice, 
thus may not make it much more difficult to condemn these areas.  And the 
South Dakota statute is ambiguous on this issue.7  In any case, South Da-
kota has hardly been, or will hardly ever be, a major site of urban redevel-
opment initiatives.  The fact remains, moreover, that post-Kelo at least 
twenty five states now set different standards for blight and non-
blight/economic condemnations, even by Professor Somin’s count. 
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Professor Somin also dismisses too quickly the expressive meaning of 
the distinction between blight and non-blight/economic development con-
demnations.8  That the people who supported reform measures containing 
this distinction may have had many reasons for doing so is surely true, but 
the fact remains that a massive, national reform movement arose from a Su-
preme Court case concerning the condemnation of solidly middle-class, 
single-family-home property owners.  Meanwhile, no reform came out of 
Berman v. Parker, a similar case years earlier concerning a poor, inner-city, 
heavily minority neighborhood in Washington, D.C.9  I cannot prove it, to 
be sure, but I believe we would not have seen a Kelo backlash if the Kelo 
case had involved the same sort of area as Berman. 
The Law and Expressive Meaning piece did not seek to answer the 
broader question of whether post-Kelo reform is bad or good for the poor, 
but as Professor Somin suggests,10 that is indeed a very important and very 
difficult question.  The answer in part depends on how the new laws will be 
enforced.  We have a very poor understanding of how current takings laws 
are enforced and what they mean in terms of economic and social effects, 
because there have been no systematic studies yet.  It is certainly possible 
that the debate over the actual implementation and social effects of the new 
laws will be equally dominated by anecdotal accounts rather than by care-
ful, apolitical studies.  As I have argued elsewhere,11 even as a theoretical 
matter it is impossible to conclude whether a ban on all condemnations or a 
ban on only blight condemnations would benefit poor urban populations, 
which is why I believe that we should move beyond these two dominant 
forms of eminent domain reform. 
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